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I. TESTIMONY
T HE voice "'sounded as if it was of a male black [sic].' '
The previous statement was the testimony of a Caucasian police of-
ficer in the recent Kentucky drug trafficking case, Cliffordv. Commonwealth.
In Clifford, the prosecution's case hinged on the quoted testimony of the
police officer concerning the race of the defendant,3 and the officer's testi-
mony about the caller's vocal characteristics helped to identify the defen-
dant as the perpetrator of the crime. The trial court, and later the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, allowed a jury to hear the testimony of the witness.
Consequently, the jury convicted the defendant of drug trafficking in the
first degree, and the court sentenced him to prison for a total of twenty
years in conjunction with another conviction.
4
At first glance, the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky appears
to be racially motivated. To many, identifying someone's race merely by
hearing his voice inevitably entails racial stereotyping. Critics point out the
evidentiary shortcomings and uncertainties of this approach, asking, "What
does an African-American's voice sound like?" Alternatively, "How does a
Caucasian voice sound?" "How does a person who is partially of African-
American descent and partially of western European descent sound?"
Although criticized by many in both the legal and lay communities,
the court in Clifford arrived at the correct determination. Exclusion of the
kind of testimony admitted in Clifford would require a complete overhaul
of the current Kentucky evidentiary system. No pressing reason exists to
change the evidentiary scheme in such a drastic way. Several factors de-
scribed in this Note, demonstrate that contrary to the critics' contentions,
i J.D. expected 2oo6, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.S. in Mathematics,
University of Kentucky, 2003. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Lawson for
his help with the evidentiary issues of this Note.
2 Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 37I, 373 (Ky. 1999) (emphasis added).
3 See infra notes I i-3o and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Clifford v.
Commonwealth).
4 Clifford, 7 S.W3d at 373, 377.
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admittance of such testimony will not inevitably lead to racial profiling and
stereotyping.
After a brief description of the facts of Cliffordv. Commonwealth in Part
II of this Note,5 Part III analyzes the admissibility of racial voice identifica-
tion testimony from a purely rules-based analysis.6 The subsequent sec-
tions consider the possibility of prejudice to the defendant7 and to society8
if a court allows the jury to hear racial-identification testimony. Finally, Part
VI addresses several main criticisms of Clifford and defends the judgment
of Kentucky's highest court.9 This Note will show that the court weighed
the relevant factors and, in accordance with the interests of the current
evidentiary system, correctly admitted the testimony of the officer.' 0 The
court's decision does not reflect racism, but rather presents a reasonable
analysis based on current evidentiary trends.
II. DESCRIPTION OF CLIFFORD V. COMMONWEALTH
A brief description of the facts is essential to better understand the issues
presented in Clifford. In May of 1996, Detective William Birkenhauer-a
representative from the Kentucky Drug Strike Force-arranged a drug
"sting" involving Gary Vanover, a police informant." Birkenhauer and
Vanover planned to initiate a drug transaction with the defendant Clifford
at Vanover's home. Upon arrival, Birkenhauer requested a quarter ounce
of crack cocaine, but Clifford informed him he only had a smaller amount
of cocaine."2 Birkenhauer said he would take whatever Clifford had and
would be back to get the rest later. Vanover and Clifford then went into
another room to get the drugs. When they emerged, Vanover, not Clifford,
carried a small bag of cocaine.' 3 The parties completed the transaction and
Birkenhauer left the premises.
Vanover later admitted that the drugs sold were actually his and that
he, not Clifford, completed the sale to Birkenhauer. Vanover contended
that Clifford was not involved in the transaction at all. 4 However, police
officers listened to the transaction between Birkenhauer, Vanover, and Clif-
ford through a wire placed on Birkenhauer. The officers outside taped the
5 See infra notes 11-3o and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 31--69 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 122-156 and accompanying text.
io Clifford, 7 S-W3d at 375-77.
i Id. at 373.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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conversation, but the trial court determined that the tapes were inaudible
and therefore inadmissible at trial.'5 Even so, the court did allow one offi-
cer, Smith, to testify as to his opinion of who participated in the transaction.
Officer Smith, who had never seen or met the defendant, stated at trial that
he heard the voice of a "male black" complete the cocaine transaction with
Detective Birkenhauer.'
6
In giving his opinion, Officer Smith stated that he had contact with Af-
rican-American males on numerous occasions. Due to Smith's experience
and exposure to African Americans, 7 the court ruled that a "proper founda-
tion was laid for [his] testimony."' 8 Therefore, the court overruled objec-
tions regarding the admissibility of Officer Smith's statements and allowed
the jury to hear his testimony. Because only one African-American male,
Clifford, was present during the drug sale and Officer Smith's testimony
identified a black male as the perpetrator, the jury convicted Clifford of
participating in the drug transaction."
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court likened Smith's testimony to
that of a witness identifying the smell of gasoline 0 or describing someone
as intoxicated."' As long as the witness is "personally familiar with the gen-
eral characteristics" of the evidence suggested, he or she can give his or her
opinion without being an expert."2 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower
court's admittance of the testimony and affirmed the jury's conviction.
Clifford later brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court
alleging insufficient evidence to warrant his conviction. 3 Clifford stated
that admission of evidence concerning racial voice identification invited
misidentification and was a violation of his due process rights.2 4 Citing the
Supreme Court case Neil v. Biggers, Clifford argued that racial voice iden-
15 Id.
16 Id. at 373-74.
17 Id. at 373,376.
i8 Id. at 376; see also infra notes 31-.69 (discussing the Kentucky rules of evidence).
19 Clifford, 7 S.W3d at 373.
2o Id. at 374 (citing King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 28o S.W 127 (Ky. 1926)).
"[Tihe average man would have great difficulty in telling just how coal oil or gasoline smells,
though acquainted with their odors, and perhaps the best description the witness could give
was to say he knew their odors, and he could smell coal or oil, or he could smell gasoline."
King, 28o S.W. at 130.
21 Clifford, 7 S.W3d at 374 (citing Howard v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 172
S.W2d 46 (Ky. 1943)).
22 Id. at 375; see infra notes 31-69 and accompanying text (discussing how various
courts have applied the collective facts rule to admit the opinions of non-expert witnesses
as evidence).
23 Clifford v. Chandler, 333 E3d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905
(2oo4).
24 Id. at 730-3 .
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tification is unconstitutional because it is unreliable!.5 However, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that Smith had not in fact identified defendant Clifford's
voice, but rather merely opined that he heard a black male's voice.16 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the overwhelming admissibility of such
evidence in jurisdictions across the country indicates that racial voice iden-
tification may meet the requisite reliability standard."
Although the court warned that prosecutors cannot use such testimony
in an unconstitutional manner'--e.g., to inflame the jury-its use is not
inherently unconstitutional. 9 Due to Clifford's constitutional election not
to testify, the court's refusal to admit the evidence would exclude the best
evidence available. Consequently, the court ruled that the prosecution pre-
sented sufficient evidence at trial to warrant conviction and that the trial
court's admission of the voice identification evidence did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights. "
III. EVIDENTARY RULES IN KENTUCKY
Historically, courts in Kentucky only allowed witnesses to testify as to facts,
not opinions.3 A strong fear existed that witness testimony regarding opin-
ion would be a waste of time or useless to the jury.3 However, throughout
the twentieth century, courts adopted a more inclusionary view of lay tes-
timony, which allowed more opinion evidence into trial.3 3 Consequently,
judges have begun to allow the jury to hear certain lay opinion testimony as
25 Id. at 731 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)). Neil does not fully support
Clifford's contention. In Neil, a woman was raped in a wooded region, where visibility was
very low. She identified the defendant as the rapist after police told him to repeat the words
that the attacker spoke at the time of the assault. The Court stated that situations involving
racial voice identification must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this instance, the Court
decided that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification, and the evidence could
properly go to the jury. Neil, 409 U.S. at 201.
z6 Chandler, 333 F.3d at 731.
27 Id. (citing United States v. Card, 86 E Supp. 2d iII5 (D. Utah 2ooo); State v. Smith,
415 S.E.2d 409 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Kinard, 696 P.2d 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Rhea
v. State, 147 S.W. 463 (Ark. 1912)).
28 Id. (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)) (describing unconstitutional
arguments which make racial statements).
29 Chandler, 333 F3d at 73 1-32.
30 Id.
31 ROBERT G. LAWSON, ThE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 6.00, at 401 (4th ed.
Matthew Bender 2003).
32 Id. (citing 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1918, at I I
(ames H. Chadboum Rev. 1978).
33 LAWSON, supra note 31, at § 6.00, at 401.
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long as the opinions are "helpful" to the jury.m In determining the admis-
sibility of lay opinions, judges rely on the requirements of Rule 701 of the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
A. Rule 701 Analysis
According to Rule 701, a non-expert witness can only give opinions or in-
ferences which are "(a) [rnationally based on the perception of the witness;
and (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue. '35 Furthermore, scholar Robert Lawson
states in his Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook that if there is no other way
for a particular fact to be determined, the "collective facts rule" permits a
lay witness to give his or her opinion of the situation. 36 Lawson emphasizes
that although the Kentucky General Assembly has not codified the "collec-
tive facts rule," it remains part of the analysis of courts interpreting Rule
701.17
In accordance with Rule 701 and the "collective facts rule," the court in
Cliffordv. Commonwealth determined that the police officer's testimony was
both rationally based on his perception and helpful in determining an issue
of fact.38 Because the identity of the individual on the tape was the main
issue of fact, the "helpful" requirement of Rule 701 was clearly satisfied. As
the "collective facts rule" states, if the only way to determine a certain ques-
tion of fact requires the admission of certain evidence, courts should admit
that evidence if it is reliable.39 Because his testimony described character-
istics of the perpetrator, the Officer Smith's testimony proved extremely
helpful to the jury. However, the major issue in Clifford's case concerned
whether the opinion of Officer Smith was "rational." Without a finding of
rationality, the first requirement of Rule 701 would not be satisfied.
The Court in Clifford cited several similar situations where lay testimo-
ny was admissible as long as the witness had sufficient exposure to make
a reasonably accurate description. 4° For example, in the case of Howard v.
34 Id.
35 Ky. R. EVID. 701.
36 LAWSON, supra note 31, at § 6.05, at 410-11. The collective facts rule allows for the
admission of opinions in certain instances where no other means exist for admission of those
opinions. For instance, where the combined effect of many different factors leave an impres-
sion on the witness that can only be conveyed through an opinion, the non-expert witness
may state the opinion rather than enumerating the factors. Id.
37 Id. at 411 (citing Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S-W.3d 371 , 374 (Ky. 1999)).
38 Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 375-76.
39 LAWSON, supra note 3 1, at § 6.05, at 410-1I; see also King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., z8o S.W. 127, 130 (Ky. 1926) (allowing witness to testify that he smelled gasoline
when no other evidence existed of the presence of gasoline. The fact that the witness could
not describe the actual smell, besides being gasoline, was of no consequence).
40 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3 d at 374-75 (citing Clement Bros. Constr. Co. v. Moore, 314 S.W.2d
2005- 2oo6 ]
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Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage ControlBd., the Court faced the issue of whether
testimony regarding the intoxication level of a person was admissible. 41 In
holding that a lay witness was competent to testify about the intoxication
level of another individual, the court stated that those with experience with
intoxicated people can identify the characteristics of inebriation. 4 The
attributes of the individual's speech-slurred words, stuttering cadence,
improper English-all can give rise to an inference of drunkenness. 43 Al-
though it may be impossible to define "intoxicated," witnesses can still
testify as to their opinion on an individual's sobriety.
Furthermore, in the case of Commonwealth v. Sego, the court confronted
the question of whether to admit lay testimony concerning the mental and
emotional state of another."4 The court explained that the collective facts
rule allows a witness to testify about the mental state of another although
the witness is not an expert in emotional distress. 4 The court cited a pre-
vious case, Emerine v. Ford, in which it was held that a nonexpert witness
could give his or her opinion concerning the mental state of another.' 6 The
Emerine court further noted, "the question of the weight and the value of
such opinion [is left] for the jury. '47 As long as the witness was able to per-
ceive the emotions and actions exhibited by the individual, and the defen-
dant has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness concerning those
perceptions, the court will consider the witness competent to testify.
48
Whether considering perceptions of the intoxication of another49 or the
mental state of another, 0 the court in Clifford stated that lay opinion can be
526 (Ky. 1958)) (admitting evidence concerning layman's opinion of speed of a moving ve-
hicle); Zogg v. O'Bryan, 237 S.W.zd 5 11 (Ky. 1951) (admitting evidence concerning opinion of
physical suffering endured by another); King v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 28o S.W.
127 (Ky. 1926) (admitting evidence concerning smell of gasoline).
41 See Howard v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 172 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1943) (admitting
evidence concerning age of person and whether that person was intoxicated).
42 Seeid. at49 (citing Gourley v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W.34,36 (Ky. 191o) ("Drunkenness
or intoxication in more or less degree is so common that there are few adult males who have
not witnessed the intoxicating effect of liquor on other people, and therefore a person who
has drunk a liquor or beverage said to be intoxicating may testify whether or not it intoxicated
him, and he may also testify as to its intoxicating effect upon other persons that he knew had
drunk the same kind of liquor or beverage."))
43 See id. at 48. The court admitted testimony of a witness concluding the intoxication
level of individuals partially from their slurred and disjunctive speech patterns. Id.
44 See Commonwealth v. Sego, 872 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1994) (admitting evidence concerning
the mental state of another).
45 Seeid. at 444.
46 See id. (citing Emerine v. Ford, 254 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ky. 1953)).
47 Emerine, 254 S.W.2d at 941.
48 See id.
49 See Howard v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 172 S.W.zd 46 (Ky. 1943).
50 See Sego, 872 S.W.2d at 441.
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admitted as long as it is founded on the witness's prior experience.' Officer
Smith's thirteen years of service exposed him to African Americans on a
daily basis. Just as courts allow people to testify about their perception of
a car's speed,5 courts should allow individuals to testify about the race of
a person whose voice they heard. In the trial and appellate courts' opinion,
prior experience of a witness was sufficient to satisfy the "rational" require-
ment of Rule 701.13
Clifford asserted in his writ of habeas corpus that testimony regarding
racial voice identification is inherently irrational and unreliable due to the
"likelihood of misidentification."5 4 Clifford's reliance on Ledbetter v. Ed-
wards and Manson v. Brathwaite is misplaced because those cases involved
pretrial procedures used by law enforcement that were highly prejudicial to
the defendant.5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the current
case is distinguishable from those relied upon by Clifford because he was
not involved in any suggestive procedure, such as a lineup or fingerprint-
ing. Rather, Officer Smith merely averred that the voice of the perpetrator
sounded African American.
5 6
B. Relevancy Requirements of Rules 401 and 402
In addition to Rule 701's requirements for admissibility, Rule 402 requires
that the evidence be relevant for it to be admissible.5 7 Relevant evidence
is defined in Rule 401 as "evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.""s
The prosecution might use racial voice identification evidence in a manner
not related to a question of fact in the trial, 9 but this was not the case in Clif-
ford. For example, there is no indication that the prosecution used the evi-
51 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 374-75 (discussing the admittance of lay testimony).
52 See id. at 374.
53 See id. at 376.
54 Clifford v. Chandler, 333 E3d 724, 731 (6th Cit. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 (2004)
(citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 E3d 1o62,
1070 (6th Cir. 1994)). A high probability of misidentification leads to inherent violation of a
defendant's due process rights. Id.
55 See Chandler, 333 E3d at 73 1.
56 See id.
57 Ky. R. EvID. 402.
58 Ky. R. EvIo. 4o.
59 See State v. Watkins, 526 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (declaring a new trial after
irrelevant racial statements concerning defendant were made in court).
2005- 2006J
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dence to inflame the jury' and no intimation that the judge inappropriately
referenced that evidence to cause undue prejudice to the defendant.
6'
However, the possibility that such impropriety could occur is not a sub-
stantial reason to implement a per se bar to admissibility. If an attorney
uses evidence in a manner not related to a question of fact in the case, the
relevance test of Rule 401 would preclude admission of the evidence. In
Clifford, the trial court ruled that evidence concerning the race of the per-
petrator was relevant because it allowed identification of the perpetrator af-
ter the crime.61 Under the Kentucky evidence law, relevance decisions are
discretionary matters for the trial court. An appellate court may therefore
only overturn a decision to admit evidence by showing that the trial court
abused its discretion."
Even if relevant, a Kentucky judge can exclude evidence under Rule
403 due to the danger of "undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury."64 Admission of racial voice identification evidence will
lead to relatively minimal prejudice. Consequently, judges should simply
rely on the standard requirements of evidence law-Rules 401, 402, and
403-instead of implementing a per se bar to admission.
C. Hearsay Analysis
At first glance, Officer Smith's testimony appears to fall within the prohibi-
tion of hearsay contained in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence,6 as Smith
testified about the out-of-court statements he heard while listening to the
drug transaction. Initially, Smith testified about the characteristics of the
speaker's voice, and that it sounded like that of a black male. The Supreme
Court thereafter coupled this testimony with Birkenhauer's testimony that
the defendant was the only African-American male present to preliminarily
conclude that the defendant was the speaker.'
Subsequently, the court asserted that the statements fell squarely with-
in Kentucky Rule of Evidence 801A(b)(1), 67 which allows a court to admit
statements by a third party "even though the declarant is available as a wit-
6o Cf. id. at 640. Several jury members referred to the perpetrator as a "darkie" during
voire dire; the court ruled that the racial comments harmed the defendant's right to a fair trial
and ordered a mistrial. Id.
61 See Chandler, 333 E3d at 732.
62 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 376.
63 See Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. I996).
64 Ky. R. EvID. 403.
65 See LAwsoN, supra note 3 1, at § 8.oo, at 549.
66 See Clifford, 7 S.W-3d at 376.
67 See id. (citing Ky. R. EvID. 8oiA(b)(i) (allowing statements of a party to be admitted if
the statement is offered against the party)).
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ness." 6 As long as the party against whom the evidence is offered has the
opportunity to explain the pertinent background of the statement, admis-
sion of these statements is not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Because Clifford was present in the courtroom,
Smith did not violate the hearsay prohibition when he was allowed to tes-
tify about the actual statements themselves and not just the characteristics
of the voice.
IV. POSSIBILITY OF UNDUE PREJUDICE TO AN INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT
In admitting racial voice identification evidence, a court must examine the
possibility of undue prejudice to the defendant. Clifford provides a suit-
able example for analysis as to whether racial voice identification leads to
undue prejudice. Readers should first note that Officer Smith-the officer
who heard Clifford over the wire transmission-did not attempt to iden-
tify Clifford in the trial. Rather, he only gave his opinion that the voice he
heard was that of a black male.70 A witness who merely identifies the race
of a voice is held to a lower standard of prior knowledge then a witness who
identifies the speaker; the first witness must have familiarity with voices of
that race, not the defendant's particular voice.7 Because Smith had never
heard Clifford's voice outside the wire transmission, 2 he did not have any
personal knowledge upon which to identify Clifford as the speaker record-
ed on the wire. However, in this case, Smith only stated that he heard the
voice of a "male black."73 Smith's general familiarity with African-American
voices is considered sufficient prior knowledge.
Furthermore, Clifford was protected, as is every defendant, by the rel-
evancy requirements of Kentucky Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. The
race of the defendant may not be relevant in some cases because of the
circumstances surrounding the crime. For instance, in a situation where
multiple African-American males and no Caucasian males were present
during a recorded drug transaction, the race of the alleged perpetrator is
irrelevant.7 4 Rule 401 requires that the evidence have some tendency to
68 KY. R. EViD. 8oiA(b)(i).
69 See LAWSON, supra note 3 1, at § 8.15131, at 588.
70 See Clifford, 7 S-W3d at 374.
71 See State v. McDaniel, 392 S.Wzd 31 o (Mo. 1965).
72 See Clifford 7 S.W.3d at 376.
73 Id. at 374.
74 See Ky. R. EViD. 401. If multiple African-American males and no Caucasian males were
present in the room during the drug transaction, evidence of the race of the perpetrator would
not "make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. Even if the per-
petrator were determined to be African American, the identity of the perpetrator would still
2005- 2oo6 ]
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make the existence of any relevant fact more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
75
The protections of Kentucky Rule of Evidence 403 operate in conjunc-
tion with the relevancy requirements of Rules 401 and 402. If the prosecu-
tion attempts to use evidence in any inappropriate or prejudicial manner,
the court can properly exclude the evidence. In Clifford, the defendant
presented no evidence that the prosecutor inappropriately used Officer
Smith's testimony to incense the jury.76 Rather, the court objectively admit-
ted the testimony, and gave the jury the discretion to weigh the evidence
and draw its own conclusions based on that evidence.77 Moreover, the
jury could have disregarded Smith's testimony and still convicted Clifford
based solely on Detective Birkenhauer's testimony.78 If, in the opinion of
the trial court, the testimony had been used to inflame the jury, the court
could have properly excluded such testimony under Rule 403.29 However,
there was no evidence in this case that the racial voice identification was
improperly used to inflame the jury or was inappropriately referenced by
the judge or other court personnel.80
Perhaps the most persuasive argument that Smith's testimony did not
prejudice Clifford is that Clifford's attorney had the opportunity to cross-
examine Smith. As the court stated, a witness must base his or her opinion
of racial identification through voice on logical, personal experience.81 Once
this foundation is laid, the witness is able to testify about his or her opin-
ions. However, cross-examination allows the defendant to show that the
witness is not familiar enough with a particular race to know the speech
characteristics of members of that race. According to a prior Kentucky case,
Louisville &N. R. Co. v. Gregory, the purpose of cross-examination is to "test
the accuracy of the knowledge of the witness, his source of information, his
motives, interest and memory."8 By questioning the witness, the defense
is able to assay the credibility of that particular witness to the point where
the jury might disregard his or her testimony."
be unascertainable. Id.
75 See id.
76 See Chandler, 333 E3d at 732.
77 See Commonwealth v. Collins, 933 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1996).
78 See Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 SW.zd i86 (Ky. '99').
79 See Ky. R. EVID. 403; see also State v. Watkins, 526 N.W.zd 638 (Minn. 1995) (ruling
that the bailiff's referral to the defendant as a "darky" in presence of the jury was sufficiently
prejudicial to the defendant's case and ordering a new trial).
8o See Chandler, 333 E3d at 732; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 277 (1987) (asserting
that racial identification could be a factor for some juries in deciding whether to sentence a
defendant to capital punishment).
81 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 376.
82 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gregory, 144 S.W.2d 519, 521 (Ky. i94o).
83 See Welch v. Commonwealth, 63 SW. 984,986 (Ky. 19oi).
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. In Clifford v. Commonwealth, after the court ruled as a matter of law that
the racial identification testimony was admissible, the defense cross-exam-
ined Officer Smith. Clifford's counsel questioned Smith about his experi-
ence in dealing with people of African-American heritage to reveal whether
he had a rational basis for his conclusions.Y4 Through this questioning, the
defense was able to attack the credibility and motives of Officer Smith.
The jury was then free to draw a conclusion they wished from their per-
ceptions. Ultimately, they chose to believe Smith's testimony and convict
Clifford of drug trafficking.
Several types of questions could be used to cross-examine a witness
regarding racial voice identification. First, as the court in Clifford noted, a
proper foundation must be laid in order for a witness to testify.8 Defense
counsel could attack the -foundation presented by the witness by asking
questions about their prior experience with the racial group in question.
If they have not had extensive experience, then that particular witness's
credibility would be diminished in the eyes of the jury. A question such as
"What does an African-American's voice sound like?" would greatly chal-
lenge the witness's ability to differentiate between the people of different
races. Secondly, the defense counsel could ask the witness about what par-
ticular features of the perpetrator's voice were identifiable with the specific
race in question. Such questions will lead the jury to think about the wit-
ness's credibility to testify on the subject of the perpetrator's race. Finally,
the attorney could question the witness about his or her opportunity to
perceive and his or her memory regarding the statements in question.
As previously discussed, a court might hold some racial voice identifi-
cation evidence inadmissible by applying the relevancy requirements of
Rules 401 and 402 before admitting such evidence. 86 Furthermore, in those
instances where the evidence is relevant but counsel has used it in an in-
flammatory or improper manner, the judge still has discretion to decide if
the prejudice is too great under Rule 403 to allow admission.8 7 Finally, the
practice of cross-examination allows the defendant to expose any weak-
nesses of the witness in identifying race through voice. Due to these three
factors, admission of racial identification evidence will not automatically
lead to conviction of a defendant merely on his or her race instead of his or
her actions.
Contrary to admission, exclusion of racial identification evidence on a
per se basis could cause prejudice to the defendant. Just as racial voice
identification testimony can be used to identify the defendant as the
speaker, such evidence can be used to effectively exculpate the defendant.
84 See Clifford, 7 S-W3d at 374.
85 See id. at 376.
86 See Ky. R. EVID. 4oi; Ky. R. EVID. 402.
87 See Ky. R. EVID. 403.
2oo5-2oo6]
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For instance, in the New York case of People v. Castillo, racial voice identifi-
cation evidence helped to absolve the defendant. The trial court convicted
defendant Castillo of robbery, burglary, and sexual assault largely based
upon the testimony of the victim.88 The girl initially told investigators that
her attacker was an African-American boy of about 18 years of age. She did
not mention anything concerning his accent. The defendant was a twenty-
eight-year-old Guatemalan native who spoke halting English. 9
The Supreme Court of New York reversed these convictions because
of the probable misidentification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime.90 The court noted, "Miss B. [the witness] made no mention of an
[sic] Hispanic accent, whereas the defendant here had a marked Spanish
accent, normally speaks Spanish, has difficulty using English, and required
an interpreter in order to stand trial." 91 Obviously, the court considered the
voice of the defendant when making the decision to vacate the convic-
tions of the trial court. A per se bar to admission of evidence pertaining to
the speech pattern of a perpetrator would not only affect the prosecutions'
cases in certain instances, but would detrimentally affect some defendants
as well.
How would critics react if the situation had been reversed in Clifford,
and the defendant tried to use racial voice identification to prove that the
person committing the crime was a Caucasian male instead of a "male
black"? 9 Clifford's race, coupled with the testimony of the witness saying
the perpetrator was Caucasian, would likely prove his innocence. A per se
bar to admission of such racial voice identification evidence, however, would
keep Clifford from using the best evidence available for his defense.
V. POSSIBILITY OF PREJUDICE TO SOCIETY IN GENERAL IF
EVIDENCE ALLOWED
Not only does admission of racial voice identification evidence lead to little
possibility of prejudice to the individual defendant in a trial, there is also
little possibility of prejudice to the general public. Some commentators
believe that if courts continue to admit such evidence, prosecutors will
perpetuate racial stereotypes not just in the courtroom, but also in society.93
Nonetheless, the possibility of prejudice to society is minimal if courts
88 See People v. Castillo, 403 N.Y.S.2d 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
391 N.E.zd 997 (I979).
89 See id. at 746-47.
90 See id. at 747.
91 Id.
92 Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 373.
93 See Lis Wiehl, "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping,
18 HARv. BLACKLETrER L.J. 185, 203-09 (zoo2).
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continue to admit racial voice identification testimony in a proper manner.
Until Clifford, the state of Kentucky had not made a decision regarding
the admissibility of such evidence.94 In fact, a survey of other jurisdictions
reveals that states rarely face this question.
There are several possible reasons why the issue of racial voice iden-
tification does not arise more often. First, there is little likelihood that a
witness only heard the voice and did not perceive any other characteristic
of the criminal perpetrator. Moreover, the relevancy requirements of the
rules of evidence will often preclude the admission of voice identification
testimony. As previously discussed, Kentucky Rule of Evidence 401 states
that relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 95
Rule 402 states that, "[elvidence which is not relevant is not admissible."'
These rules largely incorporate the universally accepted principles codified
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9
The relevancy requirements of Rules 401 and 402 are inclusive of
both evidence of the prosecution and evidence of the defense. Just as the
prosecution could use racial voice identification evidence to identify the
defendant in some cases, the defense could use racial voice identification
evidence to absolve the defendant in other situations. Inclusionary notions
in evidence law are universal and not constructed to give the prosecution
the best opportunity to convict, as many critics believe. Rather, they are
designed to give the jury an opportunity to see the best evidence possible,
for both the prosecution and the accused.
Many times, the issue of the defendant's race will not play a role in his
identification. In Clifford, there were four people present during the drug
transaction, but only one was African American.' Only in rare instances,
such as Clifford, would the evidence be useful in making a question of fact
more probable or less probable as required by Rule 401. This relevancy
requirement, along with the unlikely occurrence of only hearing the voice
of a perpetrator without seeing him or her, leads to the conclusion that the
issue of racial voice identification will not face courts often. Therefore, any
possible prejudice from admission of this evidence will not lead to wide-
spread racial profiling in society, as claimed by some critics of Clifford."
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that individuals are rea-
sonably accurate when determining the race of a person after only hearing
94 See Clifford, 7 S-W.3d at 375-
95 K. R. EVID. 4Oi.
96 Ky. R. EvID. 402.
97 LAwsoN, supra note 31, at § 2.00, at 77.
98 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 373.
99 See generally Dawn L. Smalls, Linguistic Profiling and the Law, 15 STAN. L. & PoL'v REv.
579 (2004); Wiehl, supra note 93.
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their voice. In a study conducted by researchers at the University of Wis-
consin-Madison, University of Delaware, and Stanford University, 421
test subjects were required to identify the race and gender of twenty differ-
ent speakers. The test subjects correctly identified the race of the speaker
eighty-six percent of the time.' °0 More surprising is the fact that individuals
were able to identify the race of the speaker ninety-seven percent of the
time when that speaker was an African-American male.'0'
Based on these test results, the reliability of racial voice identification
is actually quite high. According to Kentucky Rule of Evidence 701, a lay-
man's testimony is admissible in court if there is a rational basis for his or
her perception102 As long as the witness has experience dealing with peo-
ple of the race he or she is identifying, the evidence tends to show that his
or her perception of the identity of the perpetrator is a rational conclusion.
Only in those rare instances when the opinion of the race of the speaker is
relevant will the court allow the jury to hear the testimony. However, even
in those situations, prejudice will not likely occur because of the likelihood
that the opinion is accurate.
Although some argue that race identification through voice prejudices
defendants, not many object to the admission of lay opinions in other ar-
eas of the law. For example, courts often allow juries to hear testimony
regarding lay opinions of the gender'0 3 or age of the perpetrator.1°4 How-
ever, are these opinions any more accurate than opinions regarding race? In
one study, linguistics Professor Elizabeth Strand of Ohio State University
sought to determine if stereotypes played a role in the identification of
gender based on voice. 05
After studying the perceptions drawn from certain speech, Professor
Strand found that listeners subconsciously make decisions about gender
based on features of the individual's pronunciation." However, the size
of the speaker's vocal tract often determines the way an individual pro-
nounces syllables. 107 What happens when an individual tries to identify a
female who has a large vocal tract or a male who has a small vocal tract?
Obviously, there is a possibility of mistake involved in identifying an indi-
vidual's gender when there is so much variation among vocal tract sizes of
people. Courts nonetheless have held that gaining the best evidence pos-
too See Thomas Purnell, William Idsardi,& John Baugh,Perceptual and PhoneticExperiments
on American English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 10,20 (999).
ioi See id.
102 See Ky. R. EVID. 701.
103 See State v. Smith, 415 S.E.2d 409 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992).
io4 See Howard v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 172 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1943).
105 See Elizabeth A. Strand, Uncovering the Rok of Gender Stereotypes in Speech Perception, 18
J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (19'9).
io6 See id. at 87.
107 Seeid. at 88.
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sible is an overriding factor.'08 Courts should analyze the issue of prejudice
symmetrically in cases involving race and/or gender. The pursuit of the
best evidence possible should similarly be the overriding factor in race-re-
lated cases. After admitting the evidence, the court should allow the jury to
perform their function of weighing the evidence to determine the correct
outcome.
Current practices in many jurisdictions further underscore the improb-
ability of prejudice involved with racial identification testimony. Courts
across the country have predominantly agreed with the Supreme Court
of Kentucky in Clifford, stating that racial voice identification evidence is
admissible. Washington State,109 South Carolina, 10 Missouri,"' and Arkan-
sas112 all adhere to the idea that the opinions of lay witnesses are suffi-
ciently reliable in voice identification situations to allow the jury to weigh
the testimony's credibility.
In State v. Kinard, the Court of Appeals of Washington ruled that chal-
lenges to the admissibility of racial voice identification evidence are analo-
gous to challenges of in-court identifications---e.g., lineups, fingerprints,
and show-ups. 113 With challenges to in-court identifications, the court said
that as long as there are no "impermissibly suggestive procedures, the
question of reliability goes only to the weight of the testimony and not its
admissibility."" 4 Racial voice identification should be treated the same as
the in-court identifications. If the evidence satisfies the relevancy, founda-
tion, and prejudice requirements of the rules of evidence, any questions of
reliability should be left for the jury.'
Although for different reasons than the court in Kinard, the Supreme
Court of Missouri came to the same conclusion in State v. McDaniel."6 Mc-
Daniel involved the question of whether a witness can testify that voices
heard during a robbery had an African-American accent." 7 Instead of analo-
io8 See Chandler, 333 F3d at 731 ("To [exclude the evidence] would result in the per-
verse result of not allowing the best evidence to be presented to the jury when the danger of
impermissible prejudice is remote.").
1o9 See State v. Kinard, 696 P.2d 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that witness was able
to testify as to her opinion that the perpetrator sounded black).
i io See State v. Smith, 415 S.E.2d 409 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that witness could
testify as to voice identification statements, leaving credibility to the jury).
iI See State v. McDaniel, 392 S.W.zd 3 10 (Mo. 1965) (stating that if proper foundation is
laid, racial voice identification testimony can carry a robbery case to the jury).
1iz See Rhea v. State, 147 S.W. 463 (Ark. 1912) (concluding that witnesses can provide
relevant and probative testimony concerning identification through hearing the perpetrator's
voice).
113 See Kinard, 696 P.zd at 605.
114 Id. at 6o4.
i 15 See generally id.
i16 SeeMcDaniel, 392 S.W.2d at 315.
117 See id.
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gizing racial-voice identification to other forms of identification in criminal
proceedings, the court in McDaniel simply applied the general rules of evi-
dence. McDaniel held that courts should allow the jury to hear racial voice
identification testimony as long as counsel lays the proper foundation and
the testimony does not try to identify the defendant specifically."' Accord-
ing to the court, the jury is the proper evaluator for credibility and weight.
Day-to-day occurrences expose courts to possible prejudice to de-
fendants, but courts overwhelmingly agree that admitting such evidence
outweighs any possible detrimental outcomes. The fact that a majority of
courts do allow such evidence does not necessarily show that no preju-
dice is involved. The overwhelming admission is a significant supporting
factor.
Why would a court preclude evidence concerning the race of the per-
petrator simply because of a possibility that there might be a mistake?
The prejudice involved is no less significant when a witness testifies that
the perpetrator was an eighteen-year-old male than if the witness said the
perpetrator was an African-American male." 9 Howard v. Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board involved the admissibility of testimony regarding
age and intoxication level of bar patrons. The appellate court ruled that a
witness could testify on both age and intoxication issues as long as he or she
had "adequate opportunities for observation."2 0
Courts have chosen to disregard the possible bias involved with giving
opinions on gender and age in favor of the pursuit of the best possible evi-
dence. Race identification should be no different. To hold otherwise would,
in the words of the Sixth Circuit Court in Cliffordv. Chandler, "result in the
perverse result of not allowing the best evidence to be presented to the
jury when the danger of impermissible prejudice is remote."'
2 1
i18 See id.
119 See generally Howard v. Ky. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 172 S.W.zd 46 (Ky. 1943)
(holding that witness could testify as to age and condition of patrons because that opinion
did not require any specific scientific knowledge and there was no other way to convey the
impressions).
120 Id. at 49. "The courts are practically agreed that a nonexpert witness who has had
adequate opportunities for observation may, after describing a person as fully as possible, give
his opinion as to such person's age. This rule has been applied in criminal, as well as civil,
cases-as, for example, on prosecutions for selling liquors to minors or for rape, expert medical
testimony being also admissible in the last mentioned class of cases to prove the age of the
prosecutrix." Id.
iz Clifford v. Chandler, 333 F3d 724, 731 (6th Cir. 2003), cer. denied, 541 U.S. 905
(2004).
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VI. DIscussION OF CRITICISMS OF CLIFFORD V. COMMONWEALTH
As a result of the decision to admit the testimony, Kentucky's Supreme
Court has faced severe criticism from both academia and the general public.
In a scathing article in the Louisville Courier-Journal titled State's High Court
Turns to the Racist Right, David Hawpe argues that the Court's decision will
pave the way for increased racism due to racial profiling.' In likening the
decision to that of a modern-day Plessy v. Ferguson, Hawpe states that grant-
ing the use of such testimony in trial will permit juries to convict based on
"prejudice and inference" instead of reasoning and justice." 3 Hawpe views
the decision as an unneeded tumble towards a system where courts throw
individual rights out the window in pursuit of convictions."2 4 He contends
that admitting such inflammatory testimony at trial "allows racism to block
the path to justice." ' 5
After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Clifford's motion for a writ of habeas corpus, Hawpe again
attacked the decision. He stated that the use of testimony such as that of
Officer Smith in the original criminal trial will lead to "abuse and injus-
tice." 2 6 Hawpe is concerned that prosecutors and courts across the state
will be able to use this tool of prosecution as a means of persecution.
Hawpe does not give the justices on the Kentucky Supreme Court a fair
examination. Instead of investigating the reasoning behind the decision
thoroughly, Hawpe simply labeled the judgment a digression to times of
racial turmoil. Hawpe fails to recognize that the Clifford decision reflects a
trend towards a more inclusionary role for lay testimony2 7 throughout Ken-
tucky's evidence law and evidentiary systems across the country. The role
of the court is to make sure only relevant information reaches the jury;
2 8
the triers of fact must then weigh the credibility of such evidence. Obvi-
ously, with only one person in the room being African-American, Clifford
represents a situation where the race of the perpetrator is relevant to iden-
tification. As the Sixth Circuit stated, the jury was free to disbelieve the
statements of Officer Smith if they wished.2 9 The per se exclusion of the
122 See David Hawpe, State's High Court Turns to the Racist Right, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 30 , 2ooo, at DI.
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 David Hawpe, Conviction Based on 'Sounding Black' Elevates Stereotype to Evidence,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 9, 2oo3, at IoA, Metro Edition.
127 See LAWSON, supra note 3 1, at § 6.oo, at 401.
iz8 See Ky. R. EvIo. 402.
129 See Clifford v. Chandler, 333 E3d 724, 728 (6th Cit. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905
(2004).
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testimony Hawpe proposes, however, "would result in the perverse result
of not allowing the best evidence to be presented to the jury.9
1 30
Not only is Hawpe unable to identify the trend towards the more in-
clusionary approach to lay testimony, he also fails to see that admission of
such evidence will have a minimal prejudicial effect on both individuals
and society as a whole. Relevancy requirements and cross-examination are
instrumental in preventing prejudice to any defendant, especially a defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding involving race. Furthermore, the fact that
situations involving Clifford-like testimony will rarely arise means that ad-
mission in those few instances will have insignificant effects on society as
a whole. Certainly the repercussions of Clifford will not be nearly as perva-
sive as those associated -with the "separate, but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson. Hawpe simply attacked the decision without understanding the
underlying reasoning.
Along with lay commentators such as Hawpe, some academic commen-
tators have also argued against the decision handed down in Clifford. In the
article Linguistic Profiling and the Law, published in the Stanford Law and
Policy Review, Dawn Smalls argues that Officer Smith was unqualified to
speak as to the race of the voice he heard.13 ' Although the scope of eviden-
tiary rules concerning lay testimony is broad, Smalls argues that all laymen
are unable to reliably detect differences between the manner of speech
of different races. 31 She implies that the foundation for Officer Smith's
knowledge on the subject matter was specious. 13 3 If Officer Smith's limited
knowledge provides an adequate foundation for testimony, Smalls argues
"it is unclear if anyone would be unqualified to testify to the race or na-
tionality of any speaker."'t 34 Due to the unreliable nature of identification
and the "prejudicial effect" of racial identification evidence, courts should
complete serious evaluation of the circumstances before presenting such
testimony to the jury.
35
Although Smalls makes many valid points in her article, she fails to
recognize the importance of cross-examination. If a witness is unqualified
to speak on a particular topic--e.g., they have no experience in dealing
with people of the race they are identifying-the defense attorney will
impeach that witness on cross-examination. Smalls simply states that a
surprisingly large number of cases involving identification by voice do not
mention cross-examination at all.' 36 The failure of an appellate opinion to
130 Id. at 731.
131 Se Smalls, supra note 99, at 590.
132 Seeid. at 592.
133 Id. at 590.
134 Id.
135 Seeid. at 603-04.
136 See id. at 595-96.
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mention cross-examination does not automatically support the inference
that defense attorneys are not properly conducting cross-examinations at
trial. Many events occurring at the trial level are not discussed in appellate
opinions. If, however, cross-examinations have not been taking place, the
result should not be a per se bar to all racial voice identification testimony.
Rather, the result should be serious malpractice investigations of those par-
ticular attorneys.
Smalls also identifies what she believes to be an inherent problem with
allowing racial identification testimony: the possibility that people could
change the dialect of their voice to avoid identification. 37 She argues that
evidence proves many people have "considerable linguistic elasticity"' 38
and can therefore present challenges to correct identification. However,
people are also incredibly talented at feigning intoxication or insanity. Nev-
ertheless, courts consistently allow lay testimony regarding those opinions
although there is a possibility of mistake. Race should be no different-
courts should allow the jury to hear the opinion and then let it weigh that
evidence in their search for truth.
In "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereo-
typing-an article similar to Smalls' published in the Harvard Blackletter
Journal-Lis Wiehl argues that individuals often have deep-seated rac-
ist beliefs that manifest themselves in situations such as racial identifica-
tion.'39 Therefore, witnesses are unable to objectively determine the race
of the voice heard without allowing intrinsic biases to play a role. 140 Wie-
hi contends that allowing a police officer to testify that he heard a black
man's voice unconsciously legitimizes "racial discriminatory practices as a
whole."' 4 ' According to Wiehl, discrimination could lead to juries convict-
ing defendants based on race instead of relevant evidence. In her opinion,
judges should exclude such testimony from trial in order to prevent uncon-
stitutional prejudice in the criminal process.
14
1
Wiehl and Smalls fail to see that subconscious beliefs permeate areas
of evidence law apart from racial issues. People inevitably have certain un-
substantiated beliefs about age and gender, but, as the court in Clifford v.
Commonwealth stated, no one questions the admissibility of evidence per-
taining to identification of gender or age. 43 Why should courts treat race
differently?
137 See id. at 598-99.
138 Id. at 599 (quoting John Baugh, Linguistic Profiing, in BLACK LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE,
SOC'Y, & POLITICS IN AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS 155, 155-63 (Sinfree Makoni et. al eds., 2003).
139 See Wiehl, supra note 93, at 210.
140 See id. at 194-95.
141 Id. at 2 lO.
142 See id. at 203.
143 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 375.
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There is no doubt that prosecutors could use racial voice identifica-
tion evidence in a prejudicial manner if there were no systematic checks
to prevent them from doing so. The relevancy requirements of Rule 402,
anti-prejudice tools of Rule 403, and cross-examination each provide the
court with mechanisms to diminish the prejudice incurred by a criminal
defendant. With these powers, the court can admit the proper evidence,
and maintain a fair criminal trial, as required by the Constitution.
Perhaps the most compelling criticism of the decision in Cliffordwas the
dissent written by Justice Stumbo.'" Stumbo stated that Officer Smith's
testimony was incredibly prejudicial and the trial court should have ex-
cluded it under Kentucky Rule 403.15 Justice Stumbo asserted her deeply
rooted belief that individuals are incapable of identifying someone simply
from their voice. In her opinion, a variety of factors, not including race, de-
termine the sounds and cadence of someone's voice. 46 "[H]ow a person's
parents speak, the countries, regions or even neighborhoods in which he
has lived, the schools he has attended, the languages he speaks, his social
class, and even whom he admires" all contribute to the uniqueness of a
person's voice. 147 Stumbo says that there is no "rationality to the notion
that one can hear a person's skin color." 148 Without any rational basis for
his conclusions, Officer Smith's testimony did not increase the probability
that Clifford was the speaker as required by the relevancy requirements of
Rule 401.141
Justice Stumbo's argument is more legally based than Hawpe's state-
ments. She reasoned that Officer Smith's testimony had no rational basis
and therefore did not satisfy Rule 401. Justice Stumbo failed to address
evidence gathered by linguistic researcher John Baugh, however, which
shows that racial voice identification is surprisingly accurate.5 0 She simply
asserted that the way people speak has nothing to do with the color of their
skin. She also did not question the admissibility of gender identification
evidence in courts, even though researchers have shown that there is a cer-
tain level of unpredictability with auditory sex identification.'15
144 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3 d 371 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
145 See id. at 377-79 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 378 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Stumbo, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
148 Id. (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
149 See id. at 379 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
15o See Purnell, Idsardi, & Baugh, supra note ioo, at 2o (finding that subjects correctly
identified African-American males through voice 97% of the time).
15 1 See Strand, supra note 105, at 88. Variability in vocal tract size is one major distinction
between different voices. Strand also argues that gender stereotypes play a role in how we
perceive speech, stating that these stereotypes "can often induce false perceptions of reality"
in the listener. Id. at 94. Gender-based voice identification can be unreliable because "bottom-
up processing of acoustic information directly interacts with higher level information related
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Furthermore, Justice Stumbo asserted that the trial court should have
excluded the questionable evidence under a Rule 403 analysis of preju-
dice. She stated that the only African American in the courtroom was the
defendant, and that fact would lead to an impermissible inference from
the jury.' The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Rule 403 gives "'sub-
stantial' discretion to balance probative worth against harmful effects."
' 1
1
3
Reversal is only appropriate if a trial judge's decision is determined to be
an abuse of discretion s4 The Court recently defined "abuse of discretion"
as any act that is "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles."' The trial judge's decision in this case was not an abuse
of discretion as defined by the court, considering the highly reliable nature
of the testimony and that his decision was supported by precedent from
almost every jurisdiction. Although Justice Stumbo makes valid points re-
garding the Rule 403 analysis, the discretion given to trial judges is very
high in this area.
56
VII. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that a court should admit racial voice identification testi-
mony in certain instances does not open the gate to admission of all types
of racial comments during a trial. Constitutional notions of due process in
criminal proceedings will still require courts to preclude some evidence
in trials. Kentucky Rule of Evidence 402 maintains that evidence is in-
admissible unless it is relevant to the proceedings.'57 There are instances
where evidence concerning the race of the perpetrator would not be rel-
evant and would therefore be inadmissible. For example, in Minnesota v.
Watkins, several jurors referred to the defendant as a "darky" during jury
deliberations." 8 The court ruled that the racial comments harmed the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial and ordered a new trial.'59 However, in Clifford,
the prosecution did not use the racial voice identification evidence in a
prejudicial manner. They merely introduced evidence of the perpetrator's
race for identification purposes. 6' Moreover, would commentators object
to people's socially constructed stereotypes about gender." Id. at 87.
152 See Clifford, 7 S.W.3d at 378 (Stumbo, J., dissenting).
153 Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.zd 24, 29 (Ky. 1997); see also LAWSON, supra note
31,at § 2.1017], at 96.
154 See, e.g., Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.zd 534, 540 (Ky. 1988).
155 See Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. i999).
156 See LAWSON, supra note 31, at § 2.1017], at 96.
157 See Ky. R. EVID. 402.
158 See Minnesota v. Watkins, 526 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1995).
159 See id. at 639.
16o See Clifford, 333 F3d at 732.
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if racial voice identification evidence were used, as in People v. Castillo,16,
to show that the defendant was not the perpetrator? Rules 401 and 402 are
inclusionary for both prosecution and defense evidence. 61 In making the
decision to admit the evidence, the court in Clifford was simply follow-
ing the inclusionary system of evidence that legislators have established
in Kentucky.
Without a per se exclusion of racial voice identification evidence, courts
will continue to have an obligation to protect the rights of defendants in
criminal trials. However, in cases such as Clifford, admitting evidence con-
cerning racial voice identification is not likely to prejudice the defendant.
Furthermore, prejudice to society as a whole is unlikely. Therefore, it is
completely unfair to state that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky failed to properly exclude the evidence under Rule 403.
Clearly, the admission of testimony in Clifford has sparked controversy
over the practices employed by courts around the country with racial iden-
tification. However, the decision made by the Supreme Court of Kentucky
is not completely groundless, as David Hawpe contends in his article. Cer-
tainly, the decision does not mark an extreme digression to the judicially
sanctioned racism of the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but equal" doctrine
of the late nineteenth century. Contrary to Mr. Hawpe's beliefs, the jus-
tices on the Kentucky Supreme Court, like many courts across the country,
weighed the advantages of admitting the evidence with the possible preju-
dice and concluded that admission was the best option. That decision in no
way makes them racists.
161 See People v. Castillo, 403 N.YS.2d 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
16z See Ky. R. EVID. 40.
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